A Conversation with J. Gowthama Sanna, VCK Propaganda Secretary

To contextualize the following conversation with VCK Propaganda Secretary J. Gowthama Sanna, below is a brief introduction to the history and political formation of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK), or Liberation Panthers Party:

In 1982, the Bharathiya Dalit Panthers, or Dalit Panthers of India, inaugurated a new branch in Madurai, Tamil Nadu. Under the leadership of a M. Malaichamy, a twenty-seven-year-old Dalit activist and law student, the Dalit Panthers Iyakkam (movement) mobilized Dalit communities across Madurai District, drawing early support from a broad cross-section of the state’s Schedule Castes, including its three largest groups: Pallars, Paraiyars, and Arundhathiyars. In marked contrast to its counterparts in Maharashtra, the Tamil Nadu DPI espoused a politics of legal advocacy, submitting legal petitions through formal institutional channels that lobbied state and political authorities to fulfill their legal obligations to Dalit citizens. Considered collectively, these petitions pressed authorities to rectify specific abuses in the reservations system, ensure equitable access to opportunities for economic development, eradicate quotidian practices of untouchability and workplace discrimination, and safeguard the physical security of Dalit communities. The preserved record signals the failure of this early program and DPI activism waned as the 1980s progress until its activities reached a standstill following the sudden death of Malaichamy on September 14, 1989.

Then, on January 21, 1990, a handful of early DPI supporters gathered at New College House in central Madurai to formally appoint Thol. Thirumaavalavan, a young Dalit lawyer who had recently relocated to Madurai, as the new DPI chairman. Upon assuming leadership, Thirumaavalavan soon rechristened the movement as the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, or Liberation Panthers, but the movement continued to operate under both names concomitantly. Although Thirumaavalavan may have been newcomer to Madurai as well as to Dalit activism, he was already an experienced political organizer. Thirumaavalavan had earlier collaborated with the DMK student wing while completing his Juris Doctor (J.D.) at Madras Law College where he developed a reputation for bellicose oratory and spearheaded impassioned student protests supporting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam as well as their demand for a separate, autonomous Tamil homeland in neighboring Sri Lanka.

Across the 1990s, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal developed a reputation for robust Dalit advocacy, in part through a paradigm of unconventional politics. From its inaugural blockade of Madurai Railway Junction on February 12, 1994, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal deployed a brand of corporeal politics that executed strategic disruptions of the public sphere. Blockading arterial roads, prominent railway junctions, and even an attempted obstruction of the tarmac at the Madurai International Airport, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal captured media attention through provocative occupations of public space that broadcast its presence across the state. By the mid-1990s, the movement spread to the state’s northern districts where it established itself as a counterweight to the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), a political party representing Tamil Nadu’s largest backwards caste, the Vanniyars, which routinely found itself at loggerheads with the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal and its burgeoning Dalit support base. As the 1990s progressed, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal established itself as Tamil Nadu’s largest Dalit organization with a particularly strong following among youth who were inspired by its pugnacious rhetoric and militant slogans, including ‘adanga maru, attumeeru, thimirieezhu, thiruppi adi,’ or ‘refuse to be restrained, transgress all barriers, rise up, and hit back!’ Audio cassettes and wall posters often preceding the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s organizational presence within Dalit colonies, which organized ceremonies to hoist the movement flag and invited Thirumaavalavan and his associates to address their new branches, which they referred to as mughaankal, or military encampments.

As the 1990s progressed, state authorities increasingly regarded the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal as a radical outfit, sometimes likening it to a terrorism organization, and strong state pressure induced movement organizers to reappraise their strategy. By the late 1990s, authorities had incarcerated more than one hundred VCK organizers under articles of national security legislation generally reserved for underground militants and habitual criminal offenders. Many of these individuals were arrested under the National Security Act and what is colloquially referred to as the Goondas Act, legal provisions that permitted the preventive detention of movement organizers for a period of up to twelve months. Confronted with an existential crisis, movement organizers convened executive committee meetings in Perambalur and then Villupuram in 1998 to discuss formal integration within electoral democracy, allegedly to convert the upwelling of Dalit support into a political force and legitimize its protest in the eyes of state authorities. Then, in 1999, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal formally entered electoral politics and contested the 1999 Lok Sabha Election alongside the Tamil Maanila Congress, or Tamil State Congress Party, in its first parliamentary bid.

In the conversation below, J. Gowthama Sanna, VCK Propaganda Secretary, discusses a range of issues related to the formation, development, and present politics of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, which today is known as the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK), or Liberation Panthers Party. To open, Sanna shares his perspective on the circumstances surrounding the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s expansion across the 1990s and, in particular, the escalation of tensions with the PMK and its core constituents the locally-dominant Vanniyars, which is the largest Most Backwards Class (MBC) community in Tamil Nadu. As the conversation proceeds, Sanna addresses a breadth of issues including the current salience of Dalit identity as well as particular challenges posed by direct electoral participation. As the interview concludes, Sanna expounds upon an interpretation of democratic politics, drawing into question the limitations of the deliberative model of democratic politics espoused by many democratic theorists today. Rather, Sanna foregrounds the ineradicable presence of conflict as a constitutive aspect of modern democratic politics, a viewpoint that echoes Chantal Mouffe’s theory of radical democracy. Without endorsing, critiquing, or responding to specific points raised by Sanna, I present our conversation in its entirely, allowing him to proffer and foreground his views on a breadth of topics connected to democratic politics today.

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A conversation with J. Gowthama Sanna, VCK Propaganda Secretary. Personal interview conducted by Michael Collins, PhD Candidate, University of Pennsylvania.

18 February 2014

(The views expressed herein are solely those of the interviewee and should not be taken to imply those of the author)

MC: My first question pertains to the 1990s. How do you explain the intensification of police activity against the VCK as the decade progressed? Was this in part due to the death of Rajiv Gandhi and the growth of terrorism discourse in India? Or, perhaps, was it connected the budding relationship between DMK and PMK?

GS: The 1990s was a critical decade for Dalit activism and, in particular, for the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal. At the time, we operated as a social movement that spearheaded an electoral boycott as a key plank of our early program. Our chairman Thirumaavalavan and key movement organizers travelled across Tamil Nadu to promulgate this boycott, encouraging our Dalit community to withhold our ballots. This was among our chief early objectives. We felt that when you forfeit your political morality when you cast a vote. By this, we meant to imply that our electoral system was corrupt. We felt that the act of voting would convey an implicit acceptance of the electoral system. At the time, our people were angry about myriad forms of inequality, but they didn’t have the courage to confront the non-Dalits directly. Successive Dravidian governments only compounded our problems by ignoring our demands; they denied all requests raised by Dalit movements.

Following Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s death in 1956, Rao Bahadur N. Sivaraj emerged as an all India leader. He was a colleague of Dr. Ambedkar. In 1964, his death created a vacuum for Dalit politics that persisted until the 1990s. Although there were so many leaders, local Dalit leaders, they lacked the courage to raise a resolute voice that pressed our demands before the government. This was a major problem. The Dravidian parties considered these movements as subordinate forces to the DMK or AIADMK. These Dalit voices failed to even register as sound in their ears. The Dravidian parties as well as Congress and even the Communists were unconcerned about Dalits. They neither concerned themselves with untouchability and our community’s poverty nor did they consider our right to live, our land rights, or even our voting rights. This situation persisted through the 1970s and 1980s.

The 1990s provided fertile terrain for the emergence of a radical movement. Amidst this early political vacuum, some Dalit youth emerged as leaders. Thirumaavalavan, our chairman, was among those who emerged during this period. In the 1990s, he first raised the slogan, ‘adanga maru, attumiiru, thimiriyeezhu, thiruppi adi!’, or ‘refuse to be restrained, transgress barriers, rise up and hit back!’ It was his first slogan and it ignited a fire within Dalits, especially the youth. These words had a resounding impact; they mobilized our people and generated a strong impact in the Madurai area that later spread to other parts of Tamil Nadu. At the beginning, the Tamil Nadu government and Dravidian parties observed his emergence keenly from a distance. In that early phase, our movement did not concern them. They anticipated that a small organization such as ours would soon vanish.

By 1995, our movement was developing into a mass movement and had expanded from Madurai District to Cuddalore and nearby areas in northern Tamil Nadu. Prior to our emergence in the state’s northern districts, Dr. Ramadoss instigated problems in Dalit settlements as he spearheaded a protest to acquire a separate reservation quota for his Vanniyar community. With this aim, he instigated many atrocities against Dalits. This period, namely from 1987 until 1993, was a dire situation for Dalits residing in those areas. More than ten thousand Dalit huts were burned. So many people were beaten and some were even murdered. You might ask, how was this related to protests over a separate reservation quota for Vanniyars? Dr. Ramadoss felt that his community was silent by nature; they worked hard to sustain their livelihoods. He sought to heighten communal tensions in order to provoke the ire of his people, and, with this aim, he re-presented Dalits as the enemies of Vanniyars. He sparked and then directed the jealousy of his people against the Dalits, who already enjoyed reservation benefits. In those days, the Dalits were defenseless and government machinery acted as silent spectator, watching from the sidelines as premeditated atrocities continued to occur. This generated a political vacuum across the northern districts of Tamil Nadu. Thirumaavalavan and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal entered and began to fill this vacuum in the region.

MC: Why did Viduthalai Chiruthaigal only spread to the northern districts in the mid-1990s? Was this in response to specific caste atrocities? Am I correct to interpret that the movement spread in the wake of particular atrocities. For example, it was only after police gunfire killed John Thomas and Ezhumalai near Chengalpattu that VCK surface in the area.

GS: Yes, that area had only minimal connections with the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal when John Thomas and Ezhumalai were killed by police gunfire. At that time, local NGOs organized and spearheaded the Panchami Land Movement in and around Chengalpattu, raising slogans that demanded the recovery of panchami lands. The Panchami Land Movement was confined to that area. The police shooting that killed John Thomas and Ezhumalai was a state atrocity. I do not think that it was premeditated and intended to target activists of the Panchami Land Movement, but, regardless, it happened. Following that incident, Dalits sensed a need for a strong political movement. In response, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal grew in prominence in and around Chengalpattu and Kanchipuram. The people sought political support and, again, the VCK filled the vacuum.

A similar process occurred in Cuddalore District. Due to PMK atrocities, that is, Vanniyar atrocities against Dalits, the VCK took root in the district with an intent to safeguard the Dalit people. It was not only to protect the Dalits, but also to retaliate in the face of violence. The movement stood firm against Vanniyar atrocities. There were so many atrocities at that time; too many to be recorded. The Dalit people sought protection from the movement to safeguard their interests and ensure their security; this is a primary reason why people joined our movement. Foremost, you must understand that Vanniyar assertion created a vacuum in the northern districts that the VCK soon filled.

MC: Why was inter-caste violence particularly high in the mid- to late-1990s?

GS: Following 1996, the first round of local body elections occurred in Tamil Nadu. That was the main reason. At the time, many local Dalit leaders emerged who wanted to hold power in local government. They contested local body elections in many places. At first, the VCK maintained its adherence to electoral boycotts, but, even so, its local leaders contested panchayat elections in many areas without seeking the consent. In some areas, they triumphed and won election as presidents and council members in local panchayats. I presume that you are familiar with Melavalavu in Madurai District, where Kallar assailants killed seven Dalits in 1997. The VCK grew stronger following the murder because of local body elections. When that atrocity occurred, it revealed that Dalits required the backing of a strong political movement to capture power in local governmental bodies. In the absence of a strong movement, our people enduring severe intimidation and attacks simply for contesting elections. The Dalit people sensed a need for a militant and radical movement to advance their concerns and safeguard their community. According to me, this desire for a strong political movement drew them towards the VCK and contributed to its emergence.

As the VCK acquired strength through local body elections its emergence ran counter to the interests of the PMK, DMK or other existing parties. These parties decided to thwart the growth of our movement; they did not want us to enter assembly or parliamentary elections. This was the main agenda of the government. They instigated more violence and exerted strong pressure on our movement. That is the reason why so many of our cadre were booked under the Goondas Act and the National Security Act. At the time, police and intelligence agencies surveilled and incarcerated our leaders. Collectively, the PMK’s political formation, introduction of local body elections, and state repression pressed our movement towards the electoral path. The authorities were concerned that our outlook would become more radical if we continued to operated outside of electoral politics.

MC: Can you explain the connection between local body elections and increased caste atrocities?

GS: Dalit people were neither empowered in the national parliament (Lok Sabha) nor the state legislative assembly. Between Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry there are 40 Lok Sabha seats. It was not possible for our movement to win a seat in parliamentary or assembly elections. But, there was an abundance of elected seats in local government. In Tamil Nadu, there are more than 49,000 villages and 1079 small towns. Stated differently, there are more than 90,000 village hamlets for Dalits and Non-Dalits, because villages are always divided into two: the oor, a non-Dalit settlement, and cheri, the Dalit settlement. This social geography exists across Tamil Nadu and all over India.

However, in regards to political geography, there are 12,524 village panchayats, 385 panchayat unions, 32 district panchayats, 832 towns, and 12 corporations, in rural and urban local body administrations where there are presidents, ward members, district councilors, block councilors, and, in all, more than 50,000 posts. Dalits came forward to contest and fill these posts, but non-Dalits found this intolerable; they felt that if the Dalits fill these positions then they will need to share the political dais alongside them. They could not palate this social transformation.

MC: How do you explain the correlation between an ostensible increase in caste related violence and Dalit participation in local body elections?

GS: In earlier decades, local body elections were closed and Dalits could not assume such posts, but, also, they often lacked political awareness. After the VCK entered politics, Dalits began to gain political awareness and, in the process, developed a thirst for political power. This is why so many Dalits came forward to contest elections. This emerging political consciousness among Dalits concerned the the Dravidian parties; they grew wary and could not palate such a change. Due to this, the government hurled so many atrocities against Dalit activists and movements. But, we can also party attribute this to the bias of government officials who generally hail from oppressor communities. It is a common mindset, it is a caste mindset, all the caste Hindus came with a common mindset and promoted such repressive activities; they promoted this kind of social view.

If you recall, in the 1990s, the AIADMK came into power following a period of DMK rule. Initially, AIADMK strength came primarily from southern districts. Where most Dalit officer-bearers were elected in that area, the upper castes would not even allow Dalits to come and sit before them; they could not tolerate this. Previously, Dalit people had always stood before them with their hands clasped. This was the custom, but once a Dalit was elected president he now stood before the Kallars and other high caste people. As the president he had the right to sit before them and, moreover, before the entire village. But those with a casteist mindset could not digest these social changes. That is why they instigated problems and fanned caste tensions. This in turn lured the government machinery in force, which further compounded caste atrocities.

MC: In 1999, the VCK entered electoral democracy. Reflecting on the past fifteen years, what landmark gains has the VCK made through electoral politics? What has the VCK achieved as a political party that it could not have accomplished as a social movement?

GS: The VCK achieved many things as a social movement. First of all, it gave a voice to Dalits. That is the main achievement. Before VCK, there were other small movements and leaders, but they did not provide a strong voice for Dalits. This was their major shortcoming. The Dalit people had concluded, ‘This is our level in society and we cannot progress beyond it.’ Early Dalit movements and their leaders primary functioned by supporting existing political parties; they never conceived of alternative approaches. But, after the VCK’s emergence as a mass movement, it began creating problems. What kind of problems? First of all, we were not operating in a manner that supported the Dravidian parties. Previously, how did Dalits supporting them? They supported them through their right to vote. That was their primary mode of support. Across the northern districts, the VCK’s electoral boycott influenced our people; they began to question the Dravidian parties critically. In particular, Dalit youth endorsed our boycotts and many Dalits ceased to cast ballots for Dravidian parties. The emergence of VCK severed prevailing ties between Dalits and Dravidian parties. This was a critical achievement.

But, once our people had disconnected themselves from these parties, they were isolated. This isolation created a vacuum and presented them with only one option: they should come forward to accept DPI as a political party. But, how long could we operate in this vacuum? After several years, VCK rethought and redesigned its strategy following local body elections. It was not only state terrorism, which treated the DPI or VCK as if it were a terrorist movement, that pressed us toward the electoral path. We were a radical movement seeking social and political democracy. In our initial phase, movement leaders believe that extra-electoral politics provided the best avenue to generate political awareness among the oppressed people. Further, we anticipated that this strategy would draw the attention of government authorities to the voices of our people. Instead, the government machinery reacted violently. Then, our movement came to realize that electoral politics could also be used to promote political awareness among our people. With this belief, we entered electoral politics. But, returning to your question, our foremost achievement has been our ability to awaken the Dalits and provide them with clarity that our movement was different than the Dravidian parties. This is among our primary achievements. Moreover, our movement generated a profound political affect.

MC: But, has this effect spread among all Dalits in Tamil Nadu?

GS: No. I attribute this to the lingering impact of the Dravidian movement. Compare our present situation with the situation fifteen years before. The VCK has had an immense impact on Dalits and made tremendous achievements in this area.

MC: You are using the term ‘Dalit’. Was it only after the Ambedkar centenary that the term gained prominence in Tamil Nadu? In recent years, has the coherence of this term not declined? I can think of numerous movements that are not mobilizing under a Dalit banner, but rather as sub-caste organizations. Today, is the ‘Dalit’ identity losing its salience?

GS: First of all, the Dalit identity did not emerge in Tamil Nadu strictly through the Ambedkar Centenary. The Dalit identity existed well before the centenary celebrations and, in fact, it dates back to Pandit Iyothee Thass; from 1872, I believe. Although a different term may have been used, the identity was intact. For example, the depressed class identity emerged from 1920s; M.C. Raja was the first pan-Indian leader, in 1920s, maybe 1927. So, a depressed class identity was already present in Indian politics. After the emergence of Dr. Ambedkar, the people formerly known as untouchables developed a cogent identity across India.

I disagree that a Dalit identity emerged only from the 1990s. In fact, it was only in the 1990s that non-Dalit thinkers came forward and began to use this term. There were many reasons for this. Non-Dalit thinkers from radical as well as traditional left movements neither recognize Dalit movements as radical nor progressive. Because they had not read Ambedkar’s writing, they interpreted Dalit movements strictly as caste movements because they had not read Dr. Ambedkar’s writing. This was a shortcoming of their own.

Moreover, they did not accept Ambedkar as a radical leader. But, following the fall of the Soviet Union, this perspective began to change as non-Dalit thinkers reconsidered the leftist approach; they reconsidered Marx in light of ideas coming out of the west. From the late 1990s, the theory of post-modernism began to influence non-Dalit writers, most of whom were Marxists, or rather ex-Marxists, and they began to read Ambedkar. Only then, non-Dalit thinkers began to acknowledge Dalit movements from the 1990s. Dalit intellectuals do not share this perspective. Frankly, I do not share their views. The Ambedkar centenary movement was a trigger moment after a long period of silence. The Ambedkar centenary shattered the silence and precipitated a resurgence of Dalit politics. The Dalit identity formed a political identity whereas sub-caste acted as a cultural identity.

MC: Is the term ‘Dalit’ losing its salience today? Some Dalit intellectuals argue that the ‘Dalit’ identity has been appropriated and monopolized by particular sub-castes in Tamil Nadu. What is your perspective on how the ‘Dalit’ identity is used today?

GS: In the 1990s, the term ‘Dalit’ was considered a common word for our people. Still today, Dalit is a common word. Wherever you go in India, Scheduled Caste people are called as Dalits. They, themselves, identify as Dalits. But, within any given geography, they cannot escape local caste identities. Local identities were created within a local social context and convey a linguistic custom particular to that specific order. As a political term, ‘Dalit’ cannot eradicate localized differences among these subgroups. So, we should interpret the Dalit identity as a political identity; it is not a cultural identity. A sub-caste identity is a cultural identity. This is the main distinction between the two. Non-Dalit thinkers who level the charge that your question raises are themselves unable to comprehend this difference. Sub-caste is a cultural identity whereas Dalit is a political identity. Once non-Dalit thinkers and their followers come to share this perspective, they will step forward to promote ‘Dalit’ as a political identity.

For example, if you visit a village, you will find some Arunthathiyars, some Paraiyars, some Pallars, some Kallars and numerous other communities. In that area you will meet Pallars, Paraiyars and Arunthathiyars. We may consider them Dalits, but the Kallars will not call them as Dalits. They will only call them by their sub-caste identity. This is our cultural topography; we cannot escape it; neither from the Dalit side nor the non-Dalit side. Non-Dalits attempt to divide us on the basis of sub-caste differences in order to preserve their own interests; to preserve their own identity. When Kallars or Thevars raise their hands in unison to promote their identity as a Thevar, the Pallars promote their identity as a Devendra mirroring the Thevar identity; these kinds of political gimmicks exist among lower castes. In contrast, we perceive ‘Dalit’ as a political identity and sub-castes as cultural identities.

MC: Now, I want to discuss coalition politics. If you contest two parliamentary constituencies, then your party cadre and supporters are unable to support a VCK candidate in the other 38 constituencies across Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry. In effect, their electoral role is limited to canvassing votes for coalitions partners and the leading Dravidian party. How do you maintain cadre morale in constituencies where your candidates do not contest? How does the VCK continue to develop and expand its party organization when its infrastructure is routinely used to support Dravidian parties?

GS: Prior to the VCK’s emergence, Dalit movements lacked bargaining power because they never organized our people as a political force. That was a critical shortcoming. If the Dravidian parties allocated seats to Dalit leaders, it was only under their party symbol and certainly not under a separate electoral symbol. Prior to VCK, if I want to participate in elections I may be asked to stand under the [AIADMK’s] ‘two leaves’ or the [DMK’s] ‘rising sun’. There was no other option. For the first time, VCK contested under its own symbol during the 2009 Lok Sabha Election. We contested in Chidambaram and Villupuram under the ‘star’ symbol. This is a profound change. After forty years it signals a major change. In previous elections Dravidian parties and national parties stood before the Dalits as their so-called representatives and solicited their votes for themselves only. Now, the scenario has changed. They solicit Dalit votes in the name of the VCK coalition. Also, they request that their supporters vote for our party. Nevertheless, there are 40 parliamentary seats and 234 assembly seats in Tamil Nadu. In 2009, we contested only two parliamentary seats.

MC: Yes, how do you continue to develop your party organization when your cadre is only canvassing votes for Dravidian parties?

GS: Yes, this is a very important question. If we contest in only two seats, then what about the other constituencies? Our party is among the largest in Tamil Nadu as well as the largest Dalit movement. By membership, we are the forth-largest party in the state. We have a 7-10% vote bank in Tamil Nadu.

MC: How have you measured this?

GS: We conducted a membership drive and currently have 45 lakh members in our party. There are 5 crore voters Tamil Nadu. If you want to capture power, if you want to set up a government, you need only one crore votes. If we control one crore votes, we may be CM of Tamil Nadu. Just 1 or 1.5 crore votes is required. In the 2009 elections, the DMK received only 1.5 crore votes; the AIADMK received 1.78 crore votes. These are coalition tallies, not simply votes for individual parties. So, even without a coalition, controlling one crore votes could determine the next Chief Minister, it could determine the ruling party.

In our state the largest parties control only 1 to 1.5 crore votes on their own. Their voting percentage is only 25-30%. Our party has 45 lakh members. You can calculate the type of impact that this can generate. We believe that we have a 7-10% vote bank in Tamil Nadu. Despite this, the DMK only allotted us two seats in the previous parliamentary election (2009). Although the seats may be limited in quantity, this kind of electoral participation gives political and emotive strength to our movement when we contest local body elections. We prioritize local body elections and then assembly elections.

MC: Does VCK primarily focus on local body elections? Has the party experienced much success in local body elections? What support does the coalition partner provide? Are local body elections generally fought independently?

GS: Yes, during the 2011 local body election we contested without a coalition, our cadre stood and propagated with their own legs and means. Across the state our cadre waged a political struggle for their recognition. As a result, they won numerous posts. Our performance transmitted a vibrant awareness and instilled confidence within Dalits as well as other political minorities. Without a coalition, we cannot win seats in the assembly election. So, under political pressure, we will contest two seats only. But, frankly, two seats are insufficient for us. But, your question is clear and reasonable. This is not the proper way to further develop our party.

MC: For example, let us take Cuddalore District. The VCK has a very strong presence in Cuddalore; without a doubt, the party can impact electoral outcomes in the district. But, it is a common constituency and the DMK and AIADMK will not allot Cuddalore to the VCK. So, while remaining in Dravidian coalitions, you will never be able to field your own candidates in parliamentary elections in what may very well be your strongest district. After canvasing votes for one Dravidian party after another in subsequent elections, do you think your cadre will begin to lose their morale? Would contesting one election independently to prove your vote bank be a good idea? Is there any talk within the party of contesting independently?[1]

GS: You see, the VCK is not merely present in a handful of districts as is often propagated by the caste media. Rather, the VCK is a statewide party with a strong base from Madras to Kanyakumari and with more than twenty thousand mugaam, or local branches.[2] In the 2009 Lok Sabha Election, we lost the Villupuram seat by a margin of 1,500 votes despite our cadre campaigning vigorously across the constituency. But, in other parts, they did not work with the same intensity. This is partly because allied-party candidates already possessed strong contacts among their people. They only requested our support to canvass Dalit votes. That is one point. Additionally, whether we are speaking about DMK, AIADMK, or even other coalition partners, these parties do not want to recognize our people as a political force within any district. Once they recognize us, they must continue to recognize us in the future. This is the problem of our relationship with non-Dalit movements. Amidst strong political pressure, the only way to survive in electoral politics is through demonstrating our vote-bank. That is why our cadre canvassed vigorously under duress in other areas. Based on your question, I have a new light on this.

MC: If we consider early VCK leadership, most leaders came out of government jobs or worked as advocates and social organizers. There were no business tycoons among the party’s early leaders. Indian democracy, like many other democracies, is notorious for very expensive elections.

GS: Yes.

MC: From my impression, the 2009 Lok Sabha Election demonstrates the extent to which the VCK recognized ‘money power’ as a critical factor in elections. The party’s initial candidate in Villupuram, S.P. Velayutham, was not even a VCK member prior to being selected as the party’s candidate. Following the land-scam charges against Velayutham, the party then nominated K. Swamidurai, a retired high court judge, as its candidate in Villupuram. Again, Swamidurai was not a VCK party member; in fact, I am told that he was a known DMK sympathizer. It seems as if these individuals were nominated as candidates due to their financial resources, in the case of the former, or political connections, in the case of the latter. How does a small party such as VCK compete in such an expensive electoral system?

GS: Yes, we understand the difficulties of facing elections in this political environment from firsthand experience. Our democracy is very expensive. Indian democracy is exceedingly expensive. Because of this, we are only able to contest elections through a joint coalition because money is a critical factor during elections. You provided some examples regarding the previous Lok Sabha Elections (2009). At that time, I believe in 2009, the election was crucial for us and we did not have money. This is a small party, we have a lot of people behind us, but we lack sufficient funds. This is the main problem. Therefore, we depend on Dravidian parties, they have money because they have been in power, they have ruled; they possess wider local networks and stronger economic foundations. We enter Dravidian coalitions due to this financial dependence.

You mentioned Velayutham and Swamidurai; both were very wealthy. But, this is the fate of our party; it’s a kind of destiny. Most of our movement leaders are former government servants or advocates, very few are involved in business. Even among the handful of businessmen supporting our party, they are not rich; their income is comparatively moderate. As government servants, they secure their posts through reservations and they subsist on modest incomes. They are not wealthy; they are lower middle-class people. The advocates are middle-class, maybe even upper middle-class people. Money is the main problem. We require external financial support when contesting elections. In fact, we depend upon this support and this is the reason we will not contest each electoral constituencies during the upcoming parliamentary elections. At present, we are dependent upon coalition partners; that is the main problem. In 2009, we selected our candidates under intense political and economic pressure. And, even though Swamidurai contested, he was defeated by the slimmest of margins.

MC: When I speak to people about Thirumaavalavan they often share two points of praise. They tend to note his capacity for oratory, but also acknowledge that he is a simple man. Common people still feel that they can relate to him. He’s not wearing freshly pressed vestis, silk shirts, and golden jewelry. The VCK dresses as advocates and have fostered a different political culture. Was it a problem that Velayutham and Swamidurai did not fit this mold?

GS: Yeah.

MC: I understand that money is a critical factor in shaping electoral outcomes. You can elevate your principles, but if you don’t win elections the people will not continue to support you.

GS: We have very clear principles, but, speaking practically, principles do not always sell in such an expensive electoral system.

MC: In addition to money supplied by the coalition partner, I have been told that individual candidates are expected to front anywhere between 50 lakh and 2 crore to support their campaign. I doubt that any original VCK members have such a sum that they are able to allocate toward electoral expenditure.

The VCK developed its reputation as a Dalit party, but, as a scholar studying the movement, I hesitate to call it a Dalit party today. It has taken up common agendas including issues pertaining to Tamil nationalism, water rights, and minority communities. What challenges does the VCK confront as it tries to refashion its image from that of a Dalit party to a mainstream party that addresses common issues? Electoral stipulations require that the party expand and include new vote banks. Can you speak about the limitations of a Dalit political identity and the challenges of entering the political mainstream? [1:01:50]

GS: As a Dalit party we have a clear vision. Do you regard the PMK as a common party?

MC: No.

GS: Do you regard the AIADMK as a common party?

MC: No, but I would say that the demographics of its support base is broader than VCK and PMK. By common party I am referring to a party’s support base. AIADMK obviously has strong Thevar support, but they also receive support from a broad range of castes.

GS: Caste Hindus feel as if Dalits cannot raise their voice for a common cause. This is a primary contradiction in our land. This is a major problem. They think that only non-Dalits have the capacity to raise their voice for a common cause. But, we believe that there is no common cause. What is the common cause? What is ‘the common’? Our society is not a common society. It is a package comprised of many smaller units. On the surface, something that we might call ‘the common’ may appear to exist, but it is actually comprised of many smaller units. Each political party has its own circles of support. AIADMK has its circles, DMK has its circles, PMK has its circles, and we also have our circles. From within these circles we step forward to raise our voice in the name of a common cause. But, caste Hindus refuse to accept a Dalit voice that speaks about common issues. They want to curtail a Dalit voice that speaks for a common cause because once we raise our voice for ‘the common’ the continuance of non-Dalit movements as custodians and representatives of ‘the common’ will been drawn into question.

During Ambedkar’s lifetime, Congress projected its own voice as the voice of the nation and represented Ambedkar’s voice as a subnational voice. Ambedkar contested this. He argued that the voice of Congress was not the only voice capable of addressing common issues; he also raised his voice to address common issues. So, this is the main challenge. From the origins of Congress, from the origins of the Dravidian movement, all movements share this perspective. They think that Dalits cannot raise their voice for ‘the common’. But, first of all, we do not accept the notion of ‘the common’. There is no ‘common’, only particulars that are themselves smaller components of this so-called ‘common’. If the government creates projects or schemes, the beneficiaries are always particulars; there is no common beneficiary. Reservations are not common; justice is not common; elections are not common. Are of these things are components of an abstraction that we refer to as ‘the common’. This is our perspective.

Why is VCK, as a Dalit movement, raising its voice for the common? This is an important question? First of all, the VCK was a Dalit movement during its early period. At the time, it was called the DPI, or Dalit Panther Iyakkam (movement), but later converted itself into Viduthalai Chiruthaigal. Following its transformation, Thirumaavalavan felt that Viduthalai Chiruthaigal should not work only for Dalits, but also raise its voice for Tamil Eelam and other Tamil issues. For example, take the Kaveri River dispute. Before Thirumaavalavan, Dalit movements did not raise their voice on such matters because the Kaveri issue was considered a state issue, not an issue of a particular district. DMK and AIADMK considered it to be a state issue. Dravidian parties thought that Dalits were not supposed to voice their opinions on such issues, they have no right to do so. But Thirumaavalavan came forward and organized a rally across five districts. It was a massive rally; such activities unsettled Dravidian parties. In particular, the Eelam issue was an asset of parties such as DMK, AIADMK, MDMK and PMK. Also, because rivers and natural resources are assets of upper castes, they felt that oppressed people such as the Dalits should not voice concerns on such matters.

When the VCK raised its voice, it projected itself as an equal of these parties and, further, as a representative of Tamils. How could the other parties accept such a scenario? They tried to prevent VCK from raising its voice on common issues. In response, we have continued our struggle to claim recognition as a common identity. Recognition as a common identity is a form of political power. Without a common identity we cannot fight on the common dais. So we are struggling to stand on the dais and claim a common identity. We are doing this now and we will continue to do so in the future. I may be a Dalit, but I have a language, I have native soil, I have a settlement, I have all of these things just like non-Dalit people. Why should I surrender my right to raise my voice on these issues? I should also step forward under the banner of a common identity. It is a strategy to counter these people.

MC: A former MLA once informed that four sources of power fuel Tamil politics: mass mobilization, which the VCK possesses, money, muscle and media, for which it must rely on Dravidian coalition partners. If you address the media regarding a development plan for colonies in Chengalpattu it is unlikely that any media outlet will carry the news, but if you burn an effigy of Rajapaksa in the streets, you will likely receive print, broadcast, and digital media attention. When the VCK tries to address new issues, does it receive attention? Did protests on the Kaveri River dispute garner media attention?

GS: In our state and across our nation, there is no common media. Your question suggests that we have a vested interest to capture the media attention, but not in such a manner. It’s not just for publicity. We have committed to promote causes of the oppressed; we feel that a protest during which we burn an effigy of Mr. Rajapaksha in the streets demonstrates our genuine interest in the Eelam issue. Mr. Rajapaksha is a war criminal who should be punished. In that instance, the media shared our interest in the issue and therefore broadcast our protest to a wider audience. The intention behind our protest was to advance a cause; the added benefit of media coverage reflects the VCK’s commitment to the issue.

MC: I understand that there is substantial political ownership and investment in private media.

GS: Yes, that is crystal clear. Before the VCK’s emergence, media outlets ignored news regarding Dalit people. Maybe in sensational instances, that is if our people were burnt or killed, then newspapers would carry a news item. But, media outlets never carried news about our political or social achievements; rather, they ignored our people. Then, in the 1990s, the emergence of Thirumaavalavan and the VCK was unprecedented. Today, he has a visible media presence and media outlets face pressure to publish our position when we address a common issue. It is unavoidable. This is one among the reasons that we have taken up the Kaveri issue, Mullaperiyar issue, Eelam issue, and so many other issues. Still, the media does not appreciate our stance on localized Dalit issues; once we touch it and raise such issues, they develop an allergy. When we expose these things, it also exposes the media. Due to this pressure, they are willing to allot some space for us and, only after our growth, they now carry news items covering our position on common issues.

You pointed out four sources of power: media, muscle, money and mass mobilization. Our movement has mass support. We have a lot of muscle and organizational strength. But, we lack money and media access. Although our president Mr. Thirumaavalavan has cultivated a media presence, it is not sufficient. Still we do not have our own media outlet.  All the other political parties own their own private media outlets.

MC: The VCK has discussed launching its own television channel. Will this plan materialize?

GS: Yes, I anticipate that it will happen, but we don’t have sufficient funds yet.

MC: I’m sure that it is an expensive venture, but there are also alternative forms of media. Many youth in the party are using Facebook effectively. What is the party’s approach to digital media? Is there an organizational plan to reach out to the people via digital media? Is this not possible considering widespread smartphone phone use and internet access today?

GS: Yes. We recently convened a seminar with the title ‘VCK Digital Media’. It was the first seminar on the topic, not only for VCK, but, moreover, it was the first such meeting all over India. Professor Hugo Gorringe from the University of Edinburgh, our chairman Thol. Thirumaavalavan, Mr. Sanjay Pinto of NDTV, Mr. Feraro of K.TV Chennai, and many media personalities along with myself participated and shared our views. More than 500 youth attended the seminar. This meeting provided a trigger and, shortly thereafter, all Tamil political parties conducted similar meetings. However, ours was the first. Further, we promoted youth to spearhead this branch of the movement. At first, our name was e-VCK and launched many websites. In the field of digital media, we inaugurated e-VCK and conducted several seminars in which intellectuals came together to present their ideas on how to best harness the power of digital media: Facebook, Twitter, and other social platforms. We initiated this conversation and then, based on our idea, other political parties followed suit and launched similar events. We had an impact, it was unavoidable, and now we have a cyber-war!

MC: Digital media enables you to sidestep this problem. One benefit of social media is that your news reaches your audience directly. Recently, a VCK youth in Kanchipuram District posted photos on Facebook demonstrating how government funds from the Mahatma Gandhi Rural Development Programme were used to construct separate graveyards for Dalits and non-Dalits. In effect, these photos revealed how government programs sometimes contribute to the maintenance and creation of caste-restrictive spaces. I observed firsthand how this news spread quickly among VCK youth on Facebook. This seems to be important considering that the VCK has a strong youth support base and, according to a recent survey, 45% of Indian voters are between the ages of 18-35.

GS: Yes, but a majority of Dalits are less literate; not illiterate, but less literate. In urban areas Dalits may have internet connections, but this is often true in rural areas. In rural areas our propaganda depends more heavily on visual media (i.e., wall posters) and less so on print media (i.e., newspapers, published journals). When Hugo Gorringe presented a paper at our seminar, his concluding sentence stated, ‘please work offline.’ He advised us, ‘it may prove beneficial to work online, but you must also work offline.’ This is a very astute observation, we also must do offline work. We need to interact with the people in rural areas, in villages and colonies. Certainly, youth are working online and digital media provides them with a powerful tool to reach well educated and internet-savvy audiences. But it is not as helpful when organizing Dalit communities at deeper grassroots levels; this applies both to Tamil Nadu and India more generally. Digital media is making gains in some areas, but not to the same extent as in countries like Libya as well as in western countries. Internet access may be widely accessible in the west, but this is not our current reality in India.

MC: Are you saying that smartphone-enabled internet access is limited in rural villages? Are people in villages not also accessing the internet on their phones? 

GS: Today, many people have Android and similar smartphones, but they do not fully understand their devices; they are using them just for fun. First of all, they are seeing this instrument, it’s the first time they are seeing it, and they want to enjoy them just as the others. Such devices are put to use to raise political awareness only as a secondary objective. We must continue working to usher the people into cyber politics. It’s a huge task to direct the people in that direction. At present, we are concentrating on three types of media; we concentrate foremost on print media, then on visual media, and thirdly on cyber media and social networks.

Why have we categorized media into three types? Firstly, print media is easily comprehensible to the people and, moreover, it is easily spread among the people. Also, it is comparatively less expensive. If I have Rs. 1000, I can print 2000 pamphlets. With Rs. 1000, I can print 100 posters. Print media provides an accessible and affordable medium to promote our party among the people. Secondly, in terms of visual media, we don’t have a strong presence on local television networks. National networks like Sun TV are only now presenting our news on their networks. Finally, I have already shared my views on cyber media earlier in this conversation.

MC: Does joining a DMK coalition provide greater access to media infrastructure?

GS: We have limited access on Kalaignar TV as well as some other channels. The people will observe us if we are allotted time to discuss particular matters and, thereby, we can disseminate our views without any added expense. Television coverage is very cheap, but we have less opportunity for coverage through digital media as compared to visual media. Cyber media, by which I refer to internet media, provides a global reach but receives limited exposure at the local level. First and foremost, we want to enhance our exposure at the local level. Regardless, cyber media enables us to promote our views as well, preserve our news and records, and share our accomplishments.

MC: The party appears as if constructed about Thirumaavalavan’s personality. On movement propaganda, he is the face of the party. How has his election as an MP affected the party’s overall functioning? What happens when he is away in Delhi and, therefore, not present to attend events? Does participation decline? If we compare the VCK approach to that of the PMK, Ramadoss does not contest elections. He remains in the state to to run and manage the party. Are there any ideas within the VCK to field other candidates and keep Thirumaavalavan in Tamil Nadu to focus on party organization?

GS: Yes, last election Thirumaavalavan also raised this prospect, but the people need victory. Without victory, the people will not accept someone as their leader. Only victory can create light; victory generates its own charisma. Electoral victory is critical for running and maintaining a party. Once you enter electoral politics you must win elections. This is the main stipulation of electoral politics. Without political victory you will not survive. This is the motivation behind his decision to contest parliamentary elections.

Secondly, when Thirumaavalavan stays in-station, the people come and meet him and then return to their duties. When he is not in-station, neither are the people. They travel about and attend to their own work. This is our political fate, but we need it. In other parties, like AIADMK, Jayalalitha will not go to the party headquarters because she has power. She is a chief minister; she has lots of powerful people who handle such matters. It is impossible for the people to meet her. So, if they want some power or specific needs met the people go and satisfy their needs with these people. The VCK is not like this. Without Thirumaavalavan’s charisma it is impossible to organize the people or to contest and win elections. This is our political situation.

This discussion would be irrelevant if we had not entered electoral politics because Thirumaavalavan would always be among the people. If you had wanted to go meet him, then you would travel into local areas and visit different villages. But, once he emerged as a political leader within electoral politics it became essential to capture political power. It became inescapable that our people and leaders gradually forfeited that earlier mindset. Yes, people feel their own power as the reflection of their leader’s power, that is what I have said. This is a common perspective. You have correctly represented the people’s behavior; they focus upon their own work when our leader is away. We understand that things are proceeding in this manner. If you prefer that second-tier VCK leaders enter parliament, I suspect that this situation may present itself in the future.

The next Lok Sabha election will occur in 2014, and then the Tamil Nadu Assembly Election in 2016. If Thirumaavalavan does not contest and win, what will we do in those two years? It is difficult to manage a party without political authority. So, we have asked our president to contest the upcoming Lok Sabha election. He will contest and promote our party across many villages. We promote the party through the power.

MC: How many seats to you expect to contest in the 2014 Lok Sabha Election?

GS: I expect that we request four or five, but we cannot predict how many they will give.

MC: I predict a maximum of two seats.

GS: That is possible

MC: If we consider Dalit politics within a long-term perspective, aside from the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh, Dalit parties have been unsuccessful in elections. Even Ambedkar struggled mightily in electoral politics? What can the VCK do differently?

GS: First, allow me to clarify Ambedkar’s experience. His political defeats illuminate democratic and non-democratic aspects of Indian society. Why was Ambedkar defeated? Before 1937, Dalits did not possess a voting right, but in 1937 the British introduced voting rights in local body elections.[3] Afterwards, they introduced political changes every ten years. Previously, they had imposed strict criteria on voter eligibility. If you own land, you have a voting right. If you possess a degree, you have a voting right. If you have a zamindari (pay taxes), you have a voting right. They imposed so many conditions on adult suffrage. Without these qualities, you could not vote. At that time, Ambedkar and other leaders advocated universal suffrage for all adults without regard to privilege.

Dalits received voting rights after the Poona Pact (1932). Ambedkar won that right. In 1937, the first election was introduced with popular suffrage. So, for the first time, Dalits came forward to vote. At that time, the Dalit people lacked political awareness and tended to trust the Congress Party. As I said previously, the voting system had already existed for the privileged, but the first time that Dalits voted it was not possible to select their own people. Though, in 1937, Ambedkar’s Scheduled Caste Federation contested 17 constituencies and won 13 seats. It was a successful beginning. Afterwards there was no light, only darkness, a socio-political darkness created by caste hierarchy. Caste had re-awakened and Ambedkar suffered electoral defeat. In each election that he stood independently, he was defeated. Ambedkar was defeated in the Constitution Assembly Election and the 1951 general election. In fact, his only electoral victories occurred when he joined a coalition. In his first victory, he contested with the support of Muslim League. On the second occasion, he was elected with the support of Congress. But, he was defeated whenever he stood under his own symbol. Why was he defeated? Ambedkar clearly stated that Dalits are a majority community in India, but this majority is a scattered majority. This means that Dalits form a relative minority in the electoral system.

There may be one lakh voters in a given constituency such that twenty thousand votes provide a sufficient majority. Allow me to explain. In each election, a maximum of 67% of the electorate will cast their vote. 33% of the people will not vote; only 67% will cast a ballot. Dalits comprise 20% of the electorate. Among Dalits, 95% of the people will cast their vote. This means among the 67% of voters, these Dalit votes comprise more than 35% of all votes tallied. This is a simple majority. But Dalit leaders cannot consolidate this majority. Why? Because Dalits reside in small settlements in every village. These Dalit settlements are very small. One hundred votes here, two hundred votes here, five hundred votes there. The Dalit vote is huge, but the vote is geographically scattered and ultimately split amongst political parties: Congress, DMK, AIADMK. Still today, Dalit movements do not control the Dalit vote. Because of this, this scattered majority cannot be converted into a simple majority. This is the key reason behind Ambedkar’s electoral struggles. I think this fate of the scattered majority is omnipresent in our political situation. Today, I fear that it has extended even further.

MC: I understand that labor migration has been on the rise. Since the 1980s and 1990s, laborers are increasingly migrating from villages to work in towns and urban centers…

GS: Yes, many workers are working in the grand market at Koyambedu, Chennai, but not only there. Dalit migrant laborers are present in many urban areas. After liberalization, the social economy of the village system underwent substantial revision. Secondly, mechanized equipment including tractors, seeding machines, harvesting machines and others have been introduced into rural agriculture. Earlier, some twenty laborers, generally from the Dalit cheri, were required to till and harvest one acre. Now, following technological innovation, one individual can harvest an acre within a few hours.

What about the other nineteen people? How did they respond? They, who were already landless, then became unemployed. They faced immense pressure to secure a job and stable income. Without source of income they cannot remain in the village. As a result, these individuals were pushed out from the village and entered urban areas such as Koyambedu in Chennai. Due to mechanization in the agrarian system, the Dalit people have come out of the villages. This is the central reason. Moreover, the traditional system of cultivation protected the caste system, thrusting Dalit people into subservience beneath non-Dalit landholders. Without land, they are not able to live. This landholding system sustained the power of local upper castes, but their power became diluted as Dalits began to leave.

Even though it was they who initially pressed for these agricultural changes, the caste Hindus do not accept the present scenario. They demanded technological development to boost their agrarian income, but now they cannot tolerate its effects: the exodus of Dalit laborers from villages. Everyday, this controversy is deepening. Violence has erupted. The backwards castes are observing their power, accumulated over so many years, gradually erode. By power, I refer to their earlier control over both land and labor. In the present situation, it is best for Dalits to escape the clutches of the village economy. Ambedkar said, ‘If you are going to eradicate untouchability, every village must receive a capitalized agricultural system.’ He thought that a mechanized agricultural system will eradicate the system of untouchability. So, as an ideologue, as an Ambedkarite, I welcome this situation. But, those who prefer the traditional agricultural system would not welcome these changes. As a political leader, I welcome them. The change is visible today.

MC: In 2013, I visited Dharmapuri with and spoke with inhabitants of the three Dalit colonies that were attacked. The residents stated that at least one member of most families was now working outside the district. As agrarian incomes decline and labor migration offers a viable livelihood, Dalits in Dharmapuri appears to leaving the village to work in Bangalore and Coimbatore in the construction, service, and hospitality sectors. Additionally, many Dalit women are working in NREGA and, as a result, their presence in the fields has similarly decreased. Local landholders have not only lost their field labors, but also their domestic labor. As remittances flowed into the village, it seems as if they have begun to level economic and social asymmetries between the Dalit and Vanniyar communities. I think that Dharmapuri illuminated many of these changes to the rural economy that are presently underway

GS: Yes, Dharmapuri is a case study for caste violence in Tamil Nadu that brings to light changes in the social order. You must understand something: the DMK and AIADMK do not possess a clear economic program in Tamil Nadu. They don’t have a plan to promote irrigation, they don’t have a plan to eradicate untouchability, they don’t have a plan to eradicate poverty, they don’t have a plan to transform the existing village system. Regardless of the village, the cheri and oor are segregated, there is a Dalit village and a caste Hindu village. The Dravidian parties have not eradicated such practices of social segregation. This remains visible today. These parties want maintain power to generate profits that perpetuate their existence in politics. They did not enter the political field to address the most pressing needs of the people. Additionally, these parties lack a clear political-economic agenda; they are purely populist movements that lack a political-economic agenda. They speak as if they have accomplished so many things, but the state is not developing due to the absence of a clear political and economic plan.

MC: I have been told that special economic zones only enhance the bursars of Dravidian parties, enabling them to maintain their rule by converting a fraction of these profits into campaign handouts. Are free televisions, mixers, and grinders evidence of of this?

GS: Yes, but how are we going to change this political system? It is already very expensive and very corrupt. The issues go well beyond freebies distributed to households like mixers and grinders. The basic root of the corruption and political malpractice is caste. Without caste it would not have emerged in the same way. Dalits are helpless at present; I think that we need to rethink and redesign our strategy. We will articulate a fresh plan in the near future.

[1] On February 28, 2014, Thirumaavalavan announced that the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal will contest the 2016 Assembly Election independently.

[2] The VCK uses the Tamil term ‘mugaam’, literally an army encampment, to refer to its local units rather than the conventional term ‘kilai’, meaning a unit or branch.

[3] As per the Government of India Act 1935, provincial elections were held in 1936-37 in which, for the first time, the majority of Indians were eligible to participate. Results were announced in February 1937.